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Abstract 
This paper revisits the concept of Cognitive Innovation with the aim of helping 
newcomers appreciate its (intended) demarcating purpose and relevance to the 
wider literature on cognition and creativity in the humanities, arts, and sciences. 
Particular emphasis is paid to discussion of the pitfalls of sense-making and the 
concept’s affordance. The main argument presented is that proponents of the con-
cept face the dilemma of seeking to demonstrate its transdisciplinary nature and 
applicability vis-a-vis retaining its semantic distinctness. Proceeding from a classi-
fication of Cognitive Innovation as a dispositional construct, we discuss how it 
feeds into existing research approaches and opens up new sensibilities in related 
areas. The perspectives of temporality, interdisciplinary balancing, technology, 
and metatheories are proposed as promising areas for future elaboration of the 
function of Cognitive Innovation. 
Keywords: concept analysis; creativity; interdisciplinarity; metatheory; temporality. 
 
Introduction 
In her seminal paper on concept analysis, Rodgers argues that intellectual progres-
sion is greatly impaired when definitions and attributes of fundamental concepts are 
not made clear: “[Q]uestions regarding vague or ambiguous concepts are met with 
confused responses that are dependent upon individual and often ad hoc interpreta-
tions” (Rodgers, 1989, p. 330). Conceptual unclarity characterizes several research 
areas that have become tantalizing in cognitive science within the last decades, in-
cluding creativity, consciousness, cognition and play. Research that proposes 
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measures of creativity or attempts to determine neural correlates of creativity is of-
ten criticized not on the basis of its methodological rigor, but on the basis of its claim 
to represent the concept of creativity. At the same time this might also be the root of 
disagreement between different lines of research. 
Lack of clarity regarding the concept of creativity has been a recurrent theme within 
CogNovo’s1 network of principal investigators, PhD students, affiliates, and partners, 
where presentations on creativity have often extended into dead-end discussions 
about fundamental ontological and epistemological questions. In order to overcome 
these discursive impasses, Denham and colleagues proposed the notion of Cognitive 
Innovation to help position (or perhaps displace) creativity. In this paper, we draw 
attention to the notion of Cognitive Innovation as we understand Denham (2014), 
Gummerum and Denham (2014) and Denham and Punt (2017), collectively referred 
to as “Denham and colleagues.” 
To help tighten the grip of the concept’s unique affordance, we examine a series of 
issues regarding interpretation and comprehension of the depictions by which the 
concept comes into expression. Our aim is twofold: first, to help newcomers to the 
concept appreciate its (intended) demarcating purpose; second, to suggest new ap-
proaches to interdisciplinary research on cognition. 
 
Cognitive Innovation as a Neologism 
The notion of Cognitive Innovation was coined long before the recent rendering by 
Denham and colleagues, when Acker and McReynolds (1965) introduced the Ob-
scure Figures Test as a measurement of Cognitive Innovation. Their paper references 
a talk at the annual convention of the American Psychology Association as the source 
of the term, but the available proceedings do not mention it at all (McReynolds, 
1964). Presumably the term was discussed during the talk and summarized in Acker 
and McReynolds (1965): 
It is conceived that in the course of his commerce with his2 environment, an individual 
builds up an over-all cognitive structure which for him represents the nature of reality 
and in terms of which input data should be processed. This over-all cognitive struc-
ture can be assumed to undergo certain changes over time. The processes whereby 
these changes are brought about are what is meant by “cognitive innovation,” i.e., in-
novation or the introduction of newness into the cognitive structure. (p. 851) 
                                                                  
1 CogNovo started as a doctoral training program at Plymouth University, jointly funded by the EU through 
the Marie Curie Actions and Plymouth University. For an overview of the CogNovo program 
(https://CogNovo.eu) and its twenty-four research projects, see Maranan, Loesche, and Denham (2015). 
2 For clarification: even though only male performance is discussed, females and males participated in the 
study. Presumably the assumption and results apply to both genders, even though the wording suggests 
otherwise. 
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The cognitive structure mentioned here resembles to some extent imagery or mental 
representation and individual knowledge. The manipulation of internal structures 
towards something novel is what Acker and McReynolds (1965) address with their 
use of the term Cognitive Innovation. Denham and colleagues also mention such ma-
nipulation as a key property in their articulation of the concept. Interestingly this 
exhibits some overlap between the two uses of the term, without explicit reference. 
In perhaps the most succinct linguistic definition available from their contributions, 
Denham articulates the concept of Cognitive Innovation as “a recursive process in 
which an individual probes its boundaries to seek out new knowledge, selects prom-
ising avenues for more extensive exploitation, and synthesizes what it learns within 
its growing body of knowledge” (Denham & Punt, 2017, supplement, p. 4). Denham 
refers to Cognitive Innovation as a generic and recursive function manipulating not 
just the imagery (and other explicit knowledge), but also the individual’s set of inter-
nal mental processes and the Cognitive Innovation function itself. The sum of sensory 
inputs is the third distinct parameter feeding into the Cognitive Innovation function. 
In its functional form, Cognitive Innovation is presented as 
 
𝐹𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+𝑑𝑡 ⇐ 𝐹𝑡(𝐹𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡) 
where 
𝐹 represents the mental processing of an individual, and the set of things it knows 
about, . . . 𝐹𝑡  represents all internal (mental) processes, is the set of ideas, facts, 
words, and so on that are known by the individual and can be exchanged with others, 
𝑠𝑡 are things in the world perceptually accessible to the individual and 𝑡 is an index 
of time. (Denham & Punt, 2017, supplement, p. 5) 
 
Cognitive Innovation as a Dispositional Concept 
Whereas Denham and colleagues seem to have a strong idea about the essence of 
Cognitive Innovation, we draw attention to the question of how to make sense across 
the vast range of disciplines that are engaged with cognition and innovation. Lack of 
familiarity with the concept poses at least two pitfalls in terms of sense-making. 
First, the reallocation of meaning to a compound term which makes use of omnipres-
ent words with rich historical semiotic loads requires the term to be freed from un-
intended meanings. Familiarity with its constituting terms of cognition and 
innovation may misleadingly activate interpretations that combine unintended at-
tributes of both. Cognitive science forms its own research domain, including a set of 
disciplines at the intersection between neuroscience, anthropology, artificial intelli-
gence, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology (see Thagard, 2005, p. X [sic]). Inno-
vation appears to be used within social sciences and economic and engineering 
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literature, with an emphasis on multi- and interdisciplinary work (see Crossan & 
Apaydin, 2009; Fagerberg, Fosaas, & Sapprasert, 2012). As a result, innovation has a 
number of definitions across and within different disciplines, often related to the 
“implementation of creative ideas” (Amabile, 1988, p. 126) and echoing two dimen-
sions also used for the definition of creativity on individual levels of novelty and use-
fulness (see Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Stein, 1953), but typically measured on an 
organizational level (Sawyer & Bunderson, 2013, p. 14). In short, we note that each 
of the constituting elements of Cognitive Innovation are very rich and semantically 
overloaded. As opposed to the blank slate approach of inventing an artificial word to 
describe the concept, cognition and innovation—to stay within the metaphor—have 
chalk scribbles dense enough to provide some colored but almost indistinguishable 
background. At the same time, this approach situates Cognitive Innovation in approx-
imation to metatheories, involving humans and human behavior. 
A second (general) pitfall of sense-making is that one thing is understood in terms of 
something else, be it an existing conceptual framework, terminology, or historical or 
cultural situatedness. Gadamer’s (1960) notion of fusion of horizons (Horizont-
verschmelzung) eloquently captures the inevitable compromise that takes place dur-
ing any text comprehension: two “horizons,” i.e., scopes of insight restrained by 
“historically effected consciousness,” are fused during the interpretative act—the 
horizon of the text and the one of the reader. Thus, the same description of Cognitive 
Innovation will most likely be understood quite differently by an expert on, say, Cog-
nitive Flexibility Theory (e.g., Spiro, Coulson, Feitovich, & Anderson, 1988) than by 
an expert on epistemology (e.g., Archer, 1988). Both topics share similarities with 
Denham’s description of Cognitive Innovation, but respectively emphasize the differ-
ent aspects of learning and knowledge production. While aspects and insights from 
such related domains are commensurable with the description of Cognitive Innova-
tion, it is impossible to determine in an absolute sense whether such aspects are in-
trinsic features of Cognitive Innovation. Denham may say they are, or are not, and 
someone else may say the opposite. Hereby a challenge regarding the conceptual 
clarity of Cognitive Innovation emerges: Denham’s definition of the concept—a re-
cursive process of exploration, exploitation, and synthesis—is expressed at a very 
high level of abstraction that is easily translatable or applicable to numerous do-
mains and contexts. While this genericity may be embraced and leveraged, as exem-
plified by all the writings of Denham and colleagues, the question of the concept’s 
boundary marking is left unresolved (except for the distinction between creativity 
and Cognitive Innovation).3 Whether or not this semantic fluidity is a problem de-
pends on the ontological underpinnings of the concept. 
                                                                  
3 Denham and Punt, however, seem to be aware of this contingent imposing of meaning onto the concept 
in acknowledging that what they are tackling “is, and also is not, necessarily the same thing” (Denham & 
Punt, 2017, p. 185). 
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Historically, concepts have been thought of as belonging to one of two categories 
(Rodgers, 1989): “Entity views” treat a concept as a clearly demarcated and stable 
“thing” with a rigid set of necessary and sufficient conditions. The essence and truth 
value of a concept can therefore be approached positively through a reductionist ap-
proach and should not be examined relative to some context. “Dispositional views,” 
on the other hand, treat concepts as habits or behavioral potentials. In contrast to a 
fixed and reductionist approach, they acknowledge dynamic formation of concepts 
through individuals’ interpretation and utilization as a sine qua non condition. We 
argue that the concept of Cognitive Innovation is a dispositional construct. This is 
perhaps most clearly expressed in the paper by Denham and Punt (2017), which ar-
ticulates the concept on the basis of two distinct mindsets influenced by the domains 
of computational neuroscience and media archeology, respectively. Whereas this 
dual perspective arguably supports their intention to promote Cognitive Innovation 
as a focus for collaboration between the sciences, arts, and humanities, the format of 
the paper—two self-standing essays “in which the contributing specialisms retain 
their academic and methodological distinction and voice” (Denham & Punt, 2017, 
p. 184)—does not promote fusion of disciplinary horizons by example. Bearing this 
point in mind, the “bridge” from which Denham and Punt (2017) look at Cognitive 
Innovation (as indicated by the paper’s title) is probably better understood as a nau-
tical metaphor (i.e., the platform from which a ship is commanded) than as a con-
struction that connects existing platforms across a gap. A pertinent question posed 
by this interpretation is: Where is the ship heading? 
 
Charting New Territories in Cognitive Innovation 
If we proceed from the assumption that Cognitive Innovation is a dispositional con-
struct, we can begin to envisage how the concept feeds into existing research ap-
proaches and opens up new sensibilities. The following three strands of thought 
follow from our contemplation of the notational form of the functional definition of 
Cognitive Innovation. 
 
Emphasizing the Temporality of Cognitive Innovation and Creativity 
In cognitive sciences, creativity is assumed to be a stable trait that can be measured 
without changing it. Both the functional description of creativity by Denham and col-
leagues and their characterization of Cognitive Innovation instead emphasize their 
malleability to influences over time. Even in their notation, time might be overlooked 
as a small subscript to the parameters and results, but it is a subscript to every single 
parameter. Indeed time, it could be argued, should be more explicitly addressed in 
the study of creativity as it emerges from Cognitive Innovation. 
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The effect of task-specific training has been shown for divergent and convergent 
thinking (Scott, Leritz, & Mumford, 2004), as well as insightful tasks (Weisberg, 
2014). This alteration of internal knowledge, as represented by xt in the Cognitive 
Innovation function, changes with repeated exposure and therefore time. Based on 
this empirical and anecdotal underpinning it is no surprise that time plays an im-
portant role in many theoretical models of creativity, such as the temporal stages 
mentioned by Wallas (1926) to Csikszentmihalyi (1988), and basically any idea that 
taps into the second “P” (Process) from Rhodes’ (1961) “four Ps of creativity” model, 
which uses time as an independent variable. 
Following up on this theoretical stance, it remains unclear how much the recursion 
of perceived time (for example, through Earth’s rotations around the Sun and itself) 
or technologically and culturally constructed time (rotations of minute hands on 
clocks, “the same” bus every 7 minutes) itself is intrinsically reflected in the func-
tional description by Denham and colleagues. Future discussions might want to ad-
dress the effect chrono-biological or chrono-technological processes have on the 
recursion of Cognitive Innovation. 
A temporal perspective can also be used to illustrate the difference between Cogni-
tive Innovation and creativity. Denham and colleagues characterize creativity as an 
exaptation of Cognitive Innovation and appear to suggest that creativity is a contem-
porary and socially grounded expression of what is ultimately Cognitive Innovation.4 
The distinction can be perceived with a thought experiment: What was creativity (or 
what did people think about it) 10 years ago? Probably it was similar to what we 
think now. What about 100 years ago, when the word “creativity” first emerged in 
Western languages? What about 6,500 years ago, when the wheel was invented? 
What about 525 million years ago, when the first vertebrates emerged? 525 million 
years ago, creativity was probably “non-existent,” whereas cognitive innovation 
probably did exist.  
                                                                  
4 Part of what distinguishes creativity from Cognitive Innovation is that the notion and valuation of cre-
a ⁠tivity (and what constitutes a creative product, process, or person) is contingent on its environment in 
all its social, cultural, technological, and political dimensions. For instance, it has been suggested that so-
cial risk-taking is associated with creativity (Tyagi, Hanoch, Hall, Runco, & Denham, 2017); that is to say, 
what or who is creative is not necessarily considered socially acceptable. A second distinction of Cognitive 
Innovation from creativity—potentially also a consequence of the involvement of multiple agents—is the 
application or at least applicability of the resulting products. The formula Cognitive Innovation = creativity 
+ communication + application is oversimplifying the idea of Cognitive Innovation as an “endless cycle of 
exploration, exploitation, and explanation” (see Gummerum & Denham, 2014, p. 586), but emphasizes the 
distinction to creativity nevertheless. 
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Decomposability, Balancing Interdisciplinarity, and Technology 
The functional definition of Cognitive Innovation states that it is recursively consti-
tuted of an individual’s mental processes (𝐹), their existing knowledge (𝑥), and prop-
erties of the perceptually accessible world (𝑠). Denham and Punt (2017) further 
suggest creativity is constituted not only by the terms of the Cognitive Innovation 
function, but additionally by the knowledge (𝑦 ) and cultural and societal pro-
cesses (𝐺) of the community (Denham & Punt, 2017, supplement, p. 10). We propose 
that the decomposability of Cognitive Innovation and creativity in such particular 
terms affords strategies for evaluating and advancing interdisciplinary research pro-
grams such as CogNovo. 
First, it suggests that a research group studying Cognitive Innovation and creativity 
would best be served by a disciplinary mix that included not only cognitive neurosci-
ence and psychology to cover terms 𝐹 and 𝑥, but also cultural anthropology and po-
litical sociology (which were absent in CogNovo), perhaps with an emphasis on 
ethnography as a methodology. This complement of disciplines more fully corre-
sponds to the components of the functions. 
Second, it calls for reflection on the role that computational sciences and media stud-
ies play in the research agenda of an interdisciplinary research group studying hu-
man creativity. Why should computation, media, and technology matter in this field? 
In the creativity function, where do things like hammers, telescopes and mobile 
phones fit in? Strictly speaking, they are simply part of the perceptible world, s, yet 
they seem to be more significant than that. We suggest that technology (in the sense 
of apparatuses, equipment, and tools) might be considered to constitute a special as-
pect not only of the material, perceptible world (𝑠), but also of societies’ ways of 
thinking and doing (𝐺). Describing the function of contemporary technology, Punt 
(Denham & Punt, 2017, p. 185) points out that technology serves to supplement the 
human body, either by “alleviat[ing] the hardships of nature through muscular am-
plification” (particularly in the past), whereas contemporary technology (also) ex-
tends the “limitations of the sensory range” of the human organism. Indeed, 
technology can, as McLuhan (1964) argues, be an “extension of ourselves” in that it 
extends the cognitive system as much as it can extend the body (Brey, 2000). Tech-
nology can play an active role both in perceiving the world differently and also in 
transforming it. We thus argue that technology deserves to be set aside as a special 
term in the creativity function. Hence, the creativity function 
𝐹𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡+𝑑𝑡 ⇐ 𝐹𝑡(𝐹𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡) 
might be more completely described as 
𝐹𝑡+𝑑𝑡, 𝑥𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑇𝑡+𝑑𝑡 ⇐ 𝐹𝑡(𝐹𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡 , 𝑇𝑡) 
where 𝑇 stands for technology—the apparatuses, devices, and mechanisms that ex-
tend the body and brain, and thus arguably extends (or at the very least mediates) 
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human agency (Latour, 1994). That is to say, the recursive, functional form of Cogni-
tive Innovation and creativity facilitates an extended description of cognition that is 
much in line with theories of The Extended Mind (e.g., Clark & Chalmers, 1998). This 
transcends the focus on intra-cranial processes, which historically have been the ob-
ject of cognitive studies. 
 
Cognitive Innovation and Metatheory 
The existing articulations of Cognitive Innovation do not explicitly mention any par-
ticular philosophical anchorage, nor do they claim to pertain to any context, histori-
cal era or culture. In this regard, the concept shares fundamental features with 
metatheories. One example of a metatheoretical framework with particular strong 
affinities to Cognitive Innovation is Clare Graves’ Emergent, Cyclical, Double-Helix 
Model of Adult BioPsychoSocial Systems Development (e.g., Graves, 1974). Graves’ 
lifelong project was to study no less than the developmental path of human nature. 
In the 1950s he began to collect anthropological and psychological data without hav-
ing any hypothesis, in an approach similar to what was later formalized as Grounded 
Theory by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The culmination of his work was the proposal 
of a pattern and direction in the path of human development in the form of a frame-
work that integrates various theories of human development, e.g., Maslow’s (1943) 
hierarchy of needs, and Dawkins’ (1976) idea of memes. On the basis of data collected 
over a period of more than 30 years, Graves proposed seven developmental levels of 
being or existence in the world that occur in a predictable successive order.5 
Graves’ work, we propose, is relevant for Cognitive Innovation as it demonstrates 
traces of recursion at work and also demonstrates the link to societal processes and 
community knowledge. It is a rich qualitative account of what Cognitive Innovation—
a shadowless structural description—leaves behind, so to speak. Graves’ model 
shares with the model of Cognitive Innovation the aim to account for development 
from more primitive levels or states to more sophisticated levels or states. Graves’ 
model does this by suggesting a particular direction in the spiral of development of 
human nature, whereas the model of Cognitive Innovation suggests bootstrapping 
mechanisms by which development takes place. Whether the latter qualifies for the 
label of a metatheory is debatable, but at least Cognitive Innovation lends itself as a 
useful supplement to enhancing self-reflexivity in metatheoretical frameworks like 
Graves’ in a concise way.  
                                                                  
5 Graves’ work (particularly his taxonomy of developmental levels) has been popularized by Beck and 
Cowan’s (2005) work on Spiral Dynamics and Ken Wilber’s (2000) work on Integral Theory. 




The pragmatic value of the concept of Cognitive Innovation to the academic discourse 
on creativity (and other fields) will stand its test in years to come. It is tempting, both 
to proponents and reviewers of the concept, to elaborate on possible meanings sug-
gested by the semantic load of its two constituting terms, not least because many con-
cepts in the history of cognitive studies appear to be closely related, named similarly, 
or both. However, subsuming too many principles under the concept—a likely conse-
quence of opening it up to fit existing discourses of various disciplines—comes with 
the risk of diluting its semantic span. For this reason, we have suggested that Cognitive 
Innovation ought to be thought of more in terms of a metatheoretical framework than 
as a concept. While increasing the accessibility of Cognitive Innovation to a wide au-
dience is in line with Denham and Punt's aspiration to have it provide “a theoretical 
and practical platform from which to explore disciplinary differences in our under-
standing of creativity” (Denham & Punt, 2017, p. 184), it is potentially confusing to 
propose what seems to be a semantic chameleon as a conceptual demarcation from 
creativity. In addition to pointing out this dilemma (without attempting to solve it), 
we have highlighted a few aspects of sense-making and affordances of the concept 
that we think future investigations should examine in more detail. 
While Denham and Punt (2017) do not directly propose a method to integrate their 
different disciplinary specialisms by which they approach and discuss Cognitive In-
novation, their individual horizons clearly intersect and seem to be within the reach 
of integration or fusion. It seems therefore as if the challenge of promoting Cognitive 
Innovation as a research object lies not so much in the description of the concept, but 
rather in how to study and write about it in a transdisciplinary manner. We have 
outlined a few ideas on temporality, interdisciplinary balancing and metatheories 
that we believe are important to consider in more detail in future enquiries and de-
velopments of Cognitive Innovation to navigate analytical operations in the muddy 
waters of conceptual territory. 
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